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LEGISLATURES, JUDGES, AND PAROLE BOARDS: THE
ALLOCATION OF DISCRETION UNDER DETERMINATE
SENTENCING
Dhammika Dharmapala,* Nuno Garoupa,** and Joanna M. Shepherd***
Abstract

The most significant development in criminal sentencing in recent
decades has been the shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing.
Yet no study has systematically explored the factors leading to this shift. In
this Article, we provide the first analysis to explain why state legislatures
enact reforms that significantly reduce both judges’ and parole boards’
discretion over criminal sentencing. First, we develop a political economy
model that explains why legislatures acting in their own self-interest may
be motivated to enact these laws. Our model predicts that legislatures are
more likely to enact determinate sentencing reforms when there is tension
among the political ideologies of legislatures, judges, and parole boards.
Then, we empirically test the predictions of our political economy model
using data from all fifty states over the period from 1960 to 2000. Our
analyses confirm that political variables, such as divided government, are
the primary influences on legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate
sentencing reforms. These results are consistent with our model’s
hypothesis: long histories of divided government produce clashes among
the sentencing goals of legislatures, parole boards, and judges, and
legislatures respond by enacting reforms that take power away from the
judges and parole boards. Our conclusions are especially important given
recent court cases and criticisms that challenge the future of determinate
sentencing reforms.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Criminal sentencing in the United States has undergone sweeping
changes in recent decades. The most significant development in sentencing
has been the reallocation of power away from judges and parole boards and
towards legislatures. State legislatures have accomplished this reallocation
of power by enacting determinate sentencing legislation, such as
sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing laws, and the abolition of
discretionary parole. Despite these dramatic changes in criminal
sentencing, no study has systematically explored the factors leading to this
shift. In this Article, we provide the first analysis to explain why state
legislatures enact reforms that significantly reduce both judges’ and parole
boards’ discretion over criminal sentencing.
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Explaining the factors that influence legislatures to enact determinate
sentencing reforms is especially important given recent developments in
determinate sentencing. Decisions in several recent cases threaten the
future of state sentencing guidelines and may presage further significant
changes in criminal sentencing in the near future. For example, in its
landmark Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker decisions, the
Supreme Court found both state and federal sentencing guidelines to be
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.1 Although Blakely and
Booker found unconstitutional only provisions of the Washington state and
federal sentencing systems, scholars agree that the decisions threaten the
sentencing systems of many other states.2 For example, in her Blakely
dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor identified nine other states whose
sentencing regimes may also be unconstitutional under Blakely.3 Others
have concluded that all but the District of Columbia and three of the
twenty-four states with sentencing guidelines or similar sentencing systems
are threatened.4
Similarly, constraints on parole boards have recently come under attack
as states target prison overcrowding and rising correctional expenditures.
In at least twenty-three states, correctional institutions experienced
overcrowding, with constraints on parole ranking moderately high as a
cause among correction officials.5 In 2010, the Supreme Court delayed a
final ruling, on jurisdictional grounds, on a recent court order requiring the
California prison system to house 40,000 fewer prison inmates;6
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 305 (2004). The Court set the stage for Blakely and Booker in three earlier decisions. In Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999), the Court found that a federal carjacking statute could
be unconstitutional if it allowed judges to determine the existence of sentencing factors that would
increase a defendant’s sentence. Likewise, in 2000, the Court ruled in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 476 (2000), that racial bias must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a
judge could impose an enhanced hate crime sentence. Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 588–89 (2002), the Court extended this reasoning to capital cases by requiring a jury to rule on
aggravating factors that could result in a penalty of death. In the 2004 Blakely decision, the Court
expanded these rulings to include sentencing guidelines. In the 2005 Booker decision, the Court
confirmed Blakely’s far-reaching impact by ruling that, like the Washington sentencing guidelines
held unconstitutional in Blakely, sections of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
constitutionally flawed.
2. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1049
(2005); Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at CrossPurposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1086–87 (2005); Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated
Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington: Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED.
SENT’G REP. 60, 60 (2004); Katie M. McVoy, Note, “What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come To
Pass”: Blakely, Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1613 (2005).
3. 542 U.S. at 323 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
4. For a discussion, see Wool & Stemen, supra note 2, at 62.
5. Fred Holbert & Jack E. Call, The Perspective of State Correctional Officials on Prison
Overcrowding: Causes, Court Orders, and Solutions, 53 FED. PROBATION 25, 26–27 tbls.1, 2 & 3
(1989).
6. Michael Rothfeld, U.S. Supreme Court Delays Final Ruling on California Prison Case,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/californiapolitics/2010/01/supreme-court-to-weigh-in-on-california-prison-case.html.
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constraints on discretionary parole are blamed as a primary cause for this
prison crisis in California.7
Thus, as states consider reforming their determinate sentencing
practices, it is particularly important to understand the factors that
influence legislatures to enact these reforms. An understanding of the
original motivations for these practices can provide guidance on the
directions that future reforms may take in response to the recent Supreme
Court decisions. Legislatures originally asserted that their decisions were
motivated by public interest concerns such as reducing crime rates and
sentencing disparity. However, in this Article, we provide both theoretical
reasoning and empirical evidence implying that legislatures were primarily
influenced by political and ideological concerns.
We begin in Part II by explaining the evolution of the shift from
indeterminate to determinate sentencing. Under indeterminate sentencing,
judges had considerable discretion over imposed sentences, and parole
boards had authority over actual sentences served. However, beginning in
the 1970s, states began to adopt determinate sentencing reforms, such as
sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing laws, and the abolition of
discretionary parole, in response to the growing rejection of the
discretionary and individualized punishments under the previous system.8
These reforms significantly reduce the power of judges and parole
boards. Sentencing guidelines structure the sentencing process and limit
judicial discretion by requiring judges to reference, consider, or adhere to a
specific sentencing recommendation that is typically formulated by a state
sentencing commission.9 The abolition of discretionary parole completely
excludes the parole board from the prison release decision, and truth-insentencing laws greatly reduce parole boards’ discretion by requiring that
an offender serve some minimum percentage of the pronounced sentence
before parole officials have the discretion to release the offender from
prison.10
These determinate sentencing reforms originally received significant
bipartisan support. Liberals believed that the reforms, by restricting the
discretion of judges and parole boards, would reduce sentencing
discrimination and sentence-length disparity.11 On the other hand,
conservatives believed that determinate sentencing reforms would result in
more certain and more severe sentences that would reduce crime.12
7. James Sterngold & Mark Martin, Hard Time: California’s Prisons in Crisis: High Price
of Broken Prisons: Tough Sentencing Creates Overcrowding that Endangers Inmates, Haunts
Taxpayers, S.F. CHRON., July 3, 2005, at A1.
8. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text immediately following note 22.
10. See infra note 23 and its succeeding text and text following note 37.
11. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
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However, despite this initial support, criticisms of determinate
sentencing soon emerged. Both legal scholars and judges have argued that
there are significant costs to reducing judges’ and parole boards’
discretion.13 Discretion among judges and parole boards is critical to
assessments of deterrability and the likelihood of recidivism. Only these
actors can tailor sentences to ensure that imprisonment serves its purpose
and that inmates are rehabilitated. In addition, to the extent that
determinate sentencing tended to increase the average length of sentences
served, criticisms arose in relation to the growing burden on states’
budgets.
In Part III, we explore why and under what circumstances state
legislatures enact different permutations of reforms, and in particular, what
factors influence legislatures to reallocate power over criminal sentencing
across different institutional actors. We first explain why legislatures
acting in the public interest may enact laws that constrain the discretion of
judges and parole boards. The legislatures may be motivated by concerns
over high crime rates, increasing correctional budgets, or sentencing
disparity.
Then, we develop a political economy model that explains why
legislatures acting in their own self-interest may be motivated to enact
these laws. Political economy theories assume that political actors are selfinterested and influenced by factors such as the pursuit of ideological
goals, the accumulation of institutional power, or re-election concerns. Our
model predicts that legislatures have an incentive to enact these reforms
when their sentencing preferences differ from the preferences of judges and
parole boards. Thus, reforms that limit the power of judges and parole
boards are more likely to be enacted when there are differences among the
sentencing goals of legislatures, judges, and parole boards.
Our political economy model produces specific predictions that we test
in Part IV. Our analyses include several variables that represent either the
political economy concerns or public interest concerns of state legislatures.
The political economy variables directly test the predictions of our political
economy model; they measure the degree of political divisiveness and
tension among the sentencing goals of legislatures, judges, and parole
boards. Likewise, we employ specific public interest variables to test
whether the purported social goals of determinate sentencing—reducing
crime and controlling correctional budgets—are consistent with the actual
data.
We analyze data from all fifty states for the period from 1960 to 2000.
First, we present and describe the basic data to identify general trends
among states that have and have not enacted determinate sentencing
reforms. Then, we perform more sophisticated analyses in order to isolate
13. See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
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the influence of political economy variables and public interest variables
on legislatures’ decisions to enact reforms. We estimate both maximum
likelihood logit models and semiparametric duration models to ensure that
our empirical findings are robust to different estimation techniques.
Our analyses confirm that political variables are a significant influence
on legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms. For
example, longer histories of divided government increase the likelihood
that legislatures will enact determinate sentencing reforms. These results
are consistent with our model’s hypothesis: long histories of divided
government produce clashes among the sentencing goals of legislatures,
parole boards, and judges. Our results suggest that legislatures respond to
this tension by enacting determinate sentencing reforms that reallocate
power away from judges and parole boards and towards the legislature
itself.
The weak results for most of the public interest variables suggest that
legislatures’ public interest concerns are not the primary drivers of
determinate sentencing reforms, as is often claimed. Instead, legislatures
appear to be primarily motivated by political economy concerns. Namely,
they tend to reallocate power away from judges and parole boards when
those groups have political ideologies that conflict with the legislatures’
preferences.
In Part V, we conclude and explain that understanding the motivations
for the adoption of determinate sentencing is essential to states that are
currently considering reform.
II. DETAILS OF STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING
LEGISLATION, AND THE ABOLITION OF DISCRETIONARY PAROLE
A complete understanding of this Article’s theoretical predictions and
empirical findings requires a brief discussion of the purposes and history of
state sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing legislation, and the
abolition of discretionary parole.14
A. Original Goals of Determinate Sentencing
States adopted determinate sentencing reforms in response to a growing
rejection of the discretionary and individualized punishments under the
previous system of indeterminate sentencing. Through the mid-1970s, all
states and the federal system had such indeterminate systems. As Michael
Tonry describes this period,

14. For a related discussion of the history of sentencing guidelines, see Joanna Shepherd,
Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
533, 537–43 (2007).
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Mandatory penalties were few in number and modest in
scope, prosecutors had unaccountable power over charging
and plea bargaining, judges’ sentencing discretion was
constrained only by statutory sentencing maximums, and
parole boards had broad or plenary authority to release
prisoners subject, usually, only to the maximum prison term
set by the judge or the legislature.15
In the 1970s and early 1980s, sentencing practices began to change as
three criticisms of indeterminate sentencing emerged. First, critics asserted
that indeterminate systems’ sentencing disparities were unfair and unjust.16
Although numerous critics of sentencing disparity emerged,17 one notable
group was the American Friends Service Committee, which argued that
racial discrimination was responsible for imprisonment disparities.18
Another influential voice was then-U.S. District Court Judge Marvin
Frankel, who argued that indeterminate sentencing was “lawless.”19
Second, rehabilitation fell from favor as a sentencing goal. An
important rationale for indeterminate sentencing was that if judges and
parole boards were given discretion over sentencing and time served, they
could individually craft sentences to match each offender’s prospects for
rehabilitation. However, several studies conducted in the 1970s doubted
the ability of prison programs to rehabilitate offenders.20
Third, critics blamed indeterminate sentencing for the period’s
dramatically increasing crime rates, asserting that sentences were too
uncertain and too lenient.21 A leading book on crime policy argued that
only more certain punishments could reduce crime.22
Legislatures enacted determinate sentencing reforms to cure the
perceived failures of indeterminate sentencing. Although states
experimented with various reforms, the most common reforms aimed to
directly reduce the discretion of either judges or parole boards. States
enacted sentencing guidelines to reduce judges’ discretion over imposed
sentences. Other states reduced parole boards’ discretion over actual time
15. Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2005).
16. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 1, 5–6 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf.
17. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 33–36 (1998).
18. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971).
19. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER ix–x (1972).
20. See, e.g., Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 22–23, 49 (1974); James Robison & Gerald Smith, The Effectiveness of
Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67, 80 (1971).
21. Tonry, supra note 15, at 1247.
22. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 192–94 (1st ed. 1977).
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served by either passing truth-in-sentencing laws or by abolishing
discretionary parole all together.
By abolishing discretionary parole, several states have completely
removed the role of the parole board in determining when a prisoner’s
release should occur. Instead of a parole board making the release decision
based on the prospects of rehabilitation and the likelihood of recidivism,
the release date is instead determined by statute.23
Truth-in-sentencing laws also reduce the role of parole boards by
requiring that an offender serve some minimum percentage of the
pronounced sentence before parole officials have the discretion to release
the offender from prison. Although these laws have no direct impact on the
court-imposed sentence, they do reduce the discrepancy between the
imposed sentence and the actual time served by the offender. By restricting
early parole, truth-in-sentencing laws greatly reduce the discretion of
parole officials.
Whereas truth-in-sentencing laws constrain parole decisions, sentencing
guidelines structure the sentencing process and limit judicial discretion by
requiring judges to reference, consider, or adhere to a specific sentencing
recommendation. “Guideline sentences are typically based on factors such
as offense severity, the offender’s prior record, the availability of
punishment alternatives, and concerns for community safety.”24 The
guidelines have narrowed the range of acceptable sentences that a judge
may impose on a convicted offender.
These determinate sentencing reforms ultimately became law because
they attracted a diverse coalition with diverse goals: they promised both to
reduce unfair disparity and to crack down on criminals.25 For example, in
California, determinate sentencing was propelled into law by an
improbable alliance of prisoners’ rights and civil liberties groups, law-andorder conservatives, and police unions.26
Liberals believed that the reforms, by restricting discretion of judges
and parole boards, would reduce sentencing discrimination and sentence23. TODD REIMERS, SENATE RESEARCH CTR., PAROLE: THEN & NOW 1–7 (1999), available at
http://www.senate.state.tx.us/SRC/pdf/ib0599.pdf.
24. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., SENTENCING DIGEST: EXAMINING CURRENT SENTENCING ISSUES
AND POLICIES 11 (1998).
25. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990 (1993) (noting disdain with discretion by both liberals objecting to it
resulting in discrimination and by conservatives decrying it leading to more crime).
26. See Sheldon L. Messinger & Phillip E. Johnson, California’s Determinate Sentencing
Statute: History and Issues, in DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 13, 21–29
(1978); Tonry, supra note 15, at 1248. See also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 38–77
(discussing the bipartisan support for federal sentencing guidelines). Although much of the public
discourse surrounding determinate sentencing in the 1970s and 1980s focused on the federal
system, arguments as to sentencing guidelines’ functions and expected impacts also applied to the
states.
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length disparity. On the other hand, conservatives believed that determinate
sentencing reforms would result in more certain and more severe sentences
that would reduce crime.27 They believed that judicial and parole board
discretion was inconsistent with deterrence.28 Conservative supporters of
determinate sentencing could invoke former FBI director J. Edgar
Hoover’s criticism of indeterminate sentencing. Hoover had frequently
condemned indeterminate sentencing, asserting that both its discretionary
sentence lengths and its focus on rehabilitation produced excessively
lenient punishments that increased crime.29 Many others supported
determinate sentencing as a get-tough program for crime reduction.30
B. History of Parole Abolition, Sentencing Guidelines, and
Truth-in-Sentencing Legislation
Despite the bipartisan support for determinate sentencing, the
enactment of specific determinate sentencing reforms varied among the
states. In 1975, Maine became the first state to abolish discretionary parole.
Other states soon followed, and by 2000, fourteen states had abolished
discretionary parole release. Table 1 presents the states that have abolished
discretionary parole along with the year in which the state legislature
abolished discretionary parole.31
Table 1
States Abolishing Discretionary Parole
State
Arizona
Delaware
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Maine
Mississippi

Year Enacted State
1994
1990
1978
1977
1993
1975
1995

Minnesota
New Mexico
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Virginia
Washington

Year Enacted
1980
1979
1994
1996
1989
1995
1984

Although Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt truth-insentencing legislation in 1911, several other states enacted similar laws in
27. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 104.
28. See id. at 59, 104 (discussing the perceived conflict between deterrence and judicial
discretion).
29. Id. at 31 (citing J. Edgar Hoover, The Dire Consequences of the Premature Release of
Dangerous Criminals through Probation and Parole, 27 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1958)).
30. For a discussion, see id. at 38–48.
31. Reimers, supra note 23, at 3 fig.2.
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the 1980s and 1990s. To further encourage the movement away from
indeterminate sentencing, the federal government passed the 1994 Crime
Act,32 which awards grants to states that can prove that offenders convicted
of a Part 1 violent crime serve at least 85% of their sentences.33 Between
1996 and 1999, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia qualified
for the federal truth-in-sentencing grants.34 Table 2 presents the states that
enacted truth-in-sentencing laws and their year of enactment.
Table 2
States Enacting Truth-in-Sentencing Laws
State
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Year Enacted
1993
1994
1994
1989
1995
1994
1995
1996
1992
1995
1995
1994
1992
1995
1994

State
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

Year Enacted
1982
1997
1995
1993
1995
1995
1997
1989
1911
1995
1996
1995
1994
1990
1999

32. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994).
33. Part 1 violent crimes are “murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault as reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for purposes of the
Uniform Crime Reports . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §13701(2).
34. The table is based on data from four publications. THOMAS J. HAMMER & MICHAEL B.
BRENNAN, 2001 WISCONSIN ACT 109: CRIMES AND THEIR PENALTIES 3 (2003),
http://www.wisspd.org/html/forprac/TISpartII.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES
AND PRISON POPULATIONS (2002), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195163.pdf; WILLIAM J.
SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING
REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 11 tbl.1.5
(2002) [hereinafter SABOL, POLICY CENTER REPORT], http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470_
FINALTISrpt.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING: AVAILABILITY OF
FEDERAL GRANTS INFLUENCED LAWS IN SOME STATES 6 fig.1 (1998), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98042.pdf.
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First developed during the late 1970s and early 1980s, sentencing
guidelines currently apply in the federal courts, eighteen states, and the
District of Columbia. Table 3 lists the states that have enacted sentencing
guidelines and the years of adoption.35
Table 3
States Enacting Sentencing Guidelines
State

Year Enacted State

Arkansas
Delaware
Florida
Kansas
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri

1994
1987
1983
1993
1992
1983
1981
1980
1997

North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

Year Enacted
1994
1996
1989
1982
1989
1993
1991
1984
1985

C. The Reforms’ Effects on the Discretion of Judges and
Parole Boards
The states’ determinate sentencing reforms are not identical.36 Truth-insentencing laws often differ in the percentage of the imposed sentence they
require convicted offenders to serve. Sentencing guidelines vary in the
degree to which judges are forced to comply with the guidelines and,
hence, in how strongly they constrain judges.37 The states that have
abolished discretionary parole have established a variety of alternative
systems to determine parole eligibility. Despite the differences, all varieties
of these reforms have achieved their goals of limiting the discretion of
either the judges or the parole boards.
The abolishment of discretionary parole has significantly reduced the
role of parole boards in determining inmates’ releases. In states that have
abolished discretionary parole, inmates are instead released by mandatory
35. The table is based on data from three publications: Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing
Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1196
(2005); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 16, at 28 tbl.3-5; SABOL, POLICY CENTER
REPORT, supra note 34. At least seven other states—Connecticut, Maine, Texas, Colorado, Nevada,
New York, and Montana—have decided, after consideration, against guidelines; Frase, supra, at
1197.
36. Many authors have discussed similarities and differences. See generally Frase, supra note
35 (analyzing the diversity in state sentencing guidelines).
37. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 24.
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parole, and release dates are determined by statute. In 1976, 65% of state
prison releases were by discretionary parole. However, by 1999, only 24%
of state prison releases were by discretionary parole, while the remaining
76% were mandatory parole releases.38
Removing parole boards from release decisions has substantially
increased the percentage of the court-imposed sentences served by prison
inmates. In 1999, inmates released by discretionary parole had served only
37% of their imposed sentences, whereas inmates released by mandatory
parole had served 61% of their imposed sentences.39
Truth-in-sentencing laws have also reduced the discretion of parole
boards in determining the time served by criminal offenders. In states with
discretionary parole release, truth-in-sentencing laws prevent parole boards
from releasing inmates before they have served the designated percentage
of their sentence. The laws have significantly increased the percentage of
the sentence that released inmates must serve. Whereas prisoners released
in 1996 served on average only 44% of their sentence,40 prisoners admitted
to prison in states with truth-in-sentencing laws served a significantly
greater percentage of their sentence. For example, thirteen states that
qualified for the Federal Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants reported
prison release data for 1997. Seven of those states reported that prisoners
released in 1997 served more than 85% of their imposed sentence, and an
additional four states reported that inmates served between 70% and 84%
of their imposed sentence.
Whereas the abolition of discretionary parole and enactment of truth-insentencing legislation greatly reduces the discretion of parole boards,
sentencing guidelines constrain judges and cause them to impose different
sentences than they would impose in the absence of the guidelines.
Individual states have conducted pre- and post-guidelines evaluations of
sentences and have concluded that sentencing guidelines have significantly
changed sentencing practices. For example, Minnesota has determined that
before the guidelines, only 62% of sentences had fallen within what the
guidelines later established as the recommended range. During the first
three years after the guidelines, at least 77% of sentences were within the
recommended range.41 Likewise, other states have found that the use of
guidelines greatly reduces the variability in sentences that resulted from
judicial discretion. For example, the 1983 Washington guidelines caused
38. JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., BEYOND THE
PRISON GATES: THE STATE OF PAROLE IN AMERICA 4 (2002), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
310583_Beyond_prison_gates.pdf.
39. TIMOTHY A. HUGHES ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE,
1990–2000, at 7 (2001).
40. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRUTH IN
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1, 13 tbl.14 (1999).
41. KAY A. KNAPP, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR
EVALUATION 43 (1984).
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sentence-length variability to decrease by 60%.42 The variability of
Oregon’s sentence lengths was reduced by 45% after the imposition of
their guidelines.43
D. Reactions to Determinate Sentencing Reforms
Proponents of determinate sentencing reforms have been delighted with
the success of these reforms.44 Sentencing guidelines have generally
achieved the legislatures’ goals of reducing variability in sentences and
increasing sentence lengths.45 Moreover, supporters point to evidence that
by curbing the discretion of judges and parole boards, determinate
sentencing reforms have curbed racial discrimination in sentencing.46
However, other commentators, both from academia and from within the
criminal justice system, have noted the large costs associated with the
increasing constraints on judges’ and parole boards’ discretion. For
example, Richard Frase has identified the harms that result when
guidelines systems make assessments of deterrability and likelihood of
recidivism “on the basis of group or actuarial risk, rather than
42. Shepherd, supra note 14, at 564.
43. KATHRYN ASHFORD & CRAIG MOSBAEK, OR. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL, FIRST YEAR
REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES: NOVEMBER 1989 TO JANUARY 1990, at 17
(1991).
44. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 25, at 145–56.
45. After Minnesota’s implementation of sentencing guidelines in 1980, the rate of
imprisonment for violent crimes increased from 61.1% to 85.9%, and average sentence lengths for
violent crimes also increased. KAY A. KNAPP, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION 21 (1984). After adoption of the 1982 Pennsylvania
sentencing guidelines, incarceration rates for violent crimes increased from 44% to 64% for
aggravated assault, from 74% to 86% for rape, and from 67% to 74% for robbery. John H. Kramer
& Robin L. Lubitz, Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Reform: The Impact of Commission-Established
Guidelines, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 481, 497 tbl.6 (1985). Sentence lengths also increased: from 8.5
months to 13.6 months for aggravated assault, from 41.5 months to 51.9 months for rape, and from
21.1 months to 21.6 months for robbery. Id. The 1983 Washington guidelines caused imprisonment
rates for violent offenses to increase from 48.8% to 65.1% from 1982 to 1985. In addition, sentence
lengths for violent crimes increased: sentences for murder increased from an average of 75 months
to a range of 109–164 months; robbery sentences increased from an average of 40 months to a range
of 40–60 months. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF
WASHINGTON STATE’S SENTENCING REFORM ACT app. C at 49 (1986). After Oregon’s
implementation of sentencing guidelines in 1989, imprisonment rates for violent crimes increased
from 62% to 89% for homicide, from 29% to 37% for assault, from 40% to 61% for rape, and from
50% to 61% for robbery. ED DEERY, OR. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, FELONY SENTENCING IN
OREGON 1994, at 49 (1997). Average sentence lengths for violent crimes increased from 34.4 to
119.8 months for homicide, from 26.1 to 32.1 months for assault, from 33.6 to 36.4 months for
robbery, and from 40.1 to 76.7 months for rape. Id. at 50. The North Carolina sentencing guidelines
enacted in 1994 have increased the imprisonment rate for violent offenders from 67% to 81% and
increased the average sentence length from 56 months to 87 months. Robin L. Lubitz, Sentencing
Changes in North Carolina, in PENAL REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 84, 86 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2001).
46. STEPHEN P. KLEIN ET AL., RACIAL EQUITY IN SENTENCING 11 (1988).
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individualized, case-by-case diagnoses.”47 Likewise, judges have been
furious that guidelines spurn judges’ skill and experience in evaluating
deterrability and the ability to be rehabilitated and that the guidelines
discard the individualized knowledge about the defendant that the judge
gains during pretrial proceedings and trial.48 For example, Oregon Judge
Michael Marcus has long opposed the reduced discretion under sentencing
guidelines. He notes, “[O]ffenders for whom public safety is best achieved
by disparate dispositions . . . should be treated differently. That an identical
crime can be committed by a psychopath or by an addict susceptible to
recovery (with equal criminal histories) does not compel identical
dispositions as a matter of fairness.”49
In a survey by the Federal Judicial Center in 1996, about 80% of district
and appellate judges said that they thought judges should be given more
discretion than permitted under the guidelines.50 In a 2002 survey of
federal court judges, 45% of the responding judges said that the federal
guidelines were too inflexible.51 Indeed, many judges are so outraged at
sentencing guidelines that they claim to have decided to retire early to
avoid sentencing with such limited discretion.52
Concerned that guidelines restricted necessary sentencing discretion,
many judges admit to evading the system. In a series of interviews with
California municipal court judges, the judges admitted to using “a variety
of methods to expand their discretion, including refusing plea bargains,
assignment of offenders to probation and community service, creative
interpretation of statutes, and recommendations to the probation
department to allow alternative placements for mandatory sentences.”53
47. Frase, supra note 35, at 433–34.
48. Michael Marcus, Blakely, Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 17 FED. SENT’G REP.
243, 244 (2005); Harlington Wood Jr., Panel Remarks, Is “Relevant Conduct” Relevant?
Reconsidering the Guidelines’ Approach to Real Offense Sentencing, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 418,
418–21 (2000).
49. Marcus, supra note 48, at 245. Other scholars discuss similar concerns. See, e.g., Daniel
J. Freed & Marc Miller, Handcuffing the Sentencing Judge: Are Offender Characteristics Becoming
Irrelevant? Are Congressionally Mandated Sentences Displacing Judicial Discretion?, 2 FED.
SENT’G REP. 189, 189 (1989/1990).
50. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED, JUDICIAL CTR., THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 6 (1997), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/gssurv
ey.pdf/$file/gssurvey.pdf.
51. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Surveying Article III Judges’ Perspectives on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 215, 216 (2003). The survey was sent to all active
Article III judges. One-half of the district court judges and one-third of the appellate judges
responded.
Id.
at
215.
The
full
survey
report
can
be
found
at
http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/judsurv.htm.
52. See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions
of Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 251 (2004) (suggesting “that the sentencing guidelines
have led district court judges to select senior status earlier. Specifically, judges take senior status
after .4 years instead of after 3 years of eligibility”).
53. Jon’a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, The Formation of Judicial Bias in Sentencing: Preliminary
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Other studies provide empirical evidence that is consistent with judges’
evasion of the guidelines. They find that both judges and juries are more
likely to acquit as the punishment following a conviction increases.54
Moreover, the likelihood of acquittal is even higher when judges and juries
have little control over the punishment required by a conviction, as in
guidelines systems.55
Commentators have expressed similar concerns over the reduction in
the parole boards’ discretion over time served. Many have asserted that
treating all inmates in the same manner by requiring them to serve at least
some minimum percentage of their sentence does not promote equality:
“Equality does not mean sameness; the term more commonly refers to the
consistent application of a comprehensible principle or mix of principles to
different cases. Excessive aggregation—treating unlike cases alike—can
violate rather than promote the principle of equality.”56
Others have argued that parole board discretion is necessary to revisit
the need for long terms of incarceration. Parole boards are critical to
assessing when imprisonment has served its purpose, when inmates have
been rehabilitated, and when the likelihood of recidivism is low.57 In
contrast, requiring inmates to serve a set percentage of their imposed
sentence undermines the efficacy of incapacitation:

Findings on “Doing Justice,” 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1995).
54. See Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under the Control of Others
Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 8 (1986) (analyzing a hypothesis that
judges or juries are more likely to render acquittals when they have little control over a mandated
punishment to avoid the imposition of inappropriate sentences); Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of
Prescribed Penalty and Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1431, 1439
(1978) (“Increasing the severity of the prescribed penalty for an offence resulted in an adjustment of
subjects’ conviction criteria such that more proof of guilt was required for conviction and thus
resulted in a reduced probability of conviction.”); Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making
Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 793–94 (1979) (finding that acquittals
are more likely when charged offense is serious); Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on
the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 211,
216 (1972) (“The present data indicate that restricting the decision alternatives available to [mock]
jurors, especially when the guilty alternative has a consequence which is perceived to be too severe,
may increase the likelihood of obtaining a not guilty verdict.”).
55. James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the
Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 385 (1991) (presents a model where juries hoping to
avoid wrongful convictions are less likely to convict after sentencing guidelines are enacted);
Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 54 (concluding that judges and juries want to be sure that appropriate
sentences are imposed); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, WASH.
U. L.Q. 151, 207, 210–11 (2005) (empirical evidence is consistent with the theory that judges are
less likely to convict under the guidelines).
56. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 916 (1991).
57. Kate Stith, Two Fronts for Sentencing Reform, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 343, 343–44 (2008).
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It is difficult enough to determine a person’s present
dangerousness—whether he would commit an offense if
released today. It is much more difficult to predict an
offender's future dangerousness—whether he would commit
an offense if released at the end of the deserved punishment
term in the future. It is still more difficult, if not impossible,
to predict today precisely how long the future preventive
detention will need to last. Yet that is what determinate
sentencing demands: the imposition now of a fixed term that
predicts preventive needs far in the future.58
Similarly, other critics argue that the possibility of early release
provides a strong incentive for many inmates to behave well and
participate in programs that aid in their rehabilitation.59 Because both truthin-sentencing laws and the abolishment of discretionary parole effectively
eliminate the possibility of early release, they take away hope for the
inmates and reduce the incentive to behave and enroll in rehabilitative
programs.60
Finally, legal scholars are also concerned that discretionary parole
release allows correctional officials to manage the prison population.61 In
contrast, when release dates are set by statute, parole boards are incapable
of controlling prison overcrowding by releasing low-risk and well-behaved
inmates. Moreover, truth-in-sentencing laws exacerbate the problem of
prison overcrowding by increasing the time served by prison inmates, at
least when holding fixed the sentence imposed and ignoring the strategic
responses of judges and juries as discussed above.62
Despite the numerous concerns about limiting judges’ and parole
boards’ discretion, many state legislatures have enacted determinate
sentencing reforms. In the next Part, we explore why and under what
circumstances state legislatures enact different permutations of reforms, in
particular when they reallocate power over criminal sentencing across
different institutional actors.
III. EXPLAINING THE ENACTMENT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING, AND ABOLITION OF DISCRETIONARY PAROLE
The decision by legislatures to enact laws that constrain the discretion
of other government officials is typically explained by either “public
58. Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1452 (2001).
59. Nora V. Demleitner, Good Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom? The Unprincipled
Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777, 779 (2009).
60. Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME &

JUST. 479, 480–81 (1999).
61. REIMERS, supra note 23, at 2.
62. Joseph A. Colquitt, Essay, Can Alabama Handle the Truth (in Sentencing)?, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 425, 436 (2009).
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interest” theory or “political economy” theory.63 Public interest theory
predicts that legislatures’ decisions are determined by the potential costs
and benefits to society of legislation. On the other hand, political economy
theory focuses on the self-interest of political actors, rather than their
faithful representation of the public interest. In this Part, we first explain
why legislatures acting in the public interest may enact laws that constrain
the discretion of judges and parole boards. Then we develop a political
economy model that explains why legislatures acting in their own selfinterest may be motivated to enact these laws.
A. Public Interest Theory
Public interest theory asserts that legislators act as faithful agents of
their constituents as they seek to further the welfare of the general public.64
Thus, the legislature would enact determinate sentencing reforms that
reduce discretion when doing so is in the best interests of society. Under
this theory, the primary factors driving the trend towards curtailing
discretion should be the social costs of crime and incarceration. For
example, excessively lenient judges and parole boards may reduce both the
incapacitative and deterrent functions of criminal punishment, causing
crime rates to increase. Thus, legislatures acting in the public interest
might pass laws that limit the judges’ and parole boards’ discretion in order
to reduce crime rates. On the other hand, excessively severe judges and
parole boards might produce lower crime rates but at the cost of straining
the correctional budget. Legislatures acting in the public interest might
enact legislation that reduces the judges’ and parole boards’ discretion in
order to lessen the fiscal burdens on the state.
Alternatively, judges and parole boards might make inconsistent
sentencing decisions, producing erratic, discriminatory, or unpredictable
sentence lengths. The public is likely to view these inconsistent sentences
as unjust, and unpredictable sentences might cause both increases in crime
and difficulty in managing correctional budgets.65 Thus, legislatures acting
in the public interest may limit the discretion of the judges and parole
boards in order to produce more uniform, predictable sentences.
Ultimately, legislatures acting in the public interest should weigh the
social benefits and social costs of crime, sentences, and incarceration costs
to achieve the correct balance.66 Many states claim that these public
63. For a discussion of several public interest theories, see generally WALKER, supra note 25.
64. For pioneering discussions of the “public interest” theory of regulation, see Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211, 217 (1976) and
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974).
65. For a discussion of unpredictable sentences’ effect on crime rates, see Shepherd, supra
note 14, at 586–87.
66. It is important to note the social benefits and costs alluded to here can include
noneconomic factors, such as the expression of values held by the public in relation to crime, as
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interest concerns were the primary drivers of determinate sentencing
reforms. One of the purported goals of sentencing guidelines was to
increase imprisonment for many criminal offenders.67 In many states, the
guideline legislation itself explicitly states that crime reduction is a central
goal.68 For example, Tennessee’s enabling statute states that the purpose of
sentencing guidelines is “to prevent crime and promote respect for the law
by . . . providing an effective general deterrent to those likely to violate the
criminal laws of this state . . . .”69 Indeed, the states that have conducted
pre- and post-guidelines implementation studies have all found that their
state’s average incarceration rates and sentence lengths increased
substantially under the systems using sentencing guidelines.70
Similarly, truth-in-sentencing legislation and the abolishment of
discretionary parole were also motivated by concerns over rising crime
rates. Discretionary parole release came “to symbolize the leniency of a
system in which inmates [were] ‘let out’ early.”71 Abolishing discretionary
parole was expected to increase the length of prison time served.72
Similarly, truth-in-sentencing laws have been embraced to ensure long
prison terms for criminal offenders.73
Some legislatures that enacted determinate sentencing reforms were
also influenced by the desire to control the fiscal burdens of imprisonment.
These states adopted sentencing guidelines in the hope of producing more
predictable sentences and controlling prison expenditures.74 In contrast,
many legislatures recognized that reforms that increased sentence lengths,
such as parole abolition and truth-in-sentencing laws, might increase
incarceration costs.75
well as economic benefits and costs.
67. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 38–48.
68. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 16, at 39 tbl.4-2.
69. TENN. CODE ANN. §40-35-102(3) & (3)(A) (2005). Likewise, Arkansas, Louisiana,
Oregon, and Washington cite public safety as a primary concern of guidelines. For a list of the
purposes of guidelines in individual states’ enabling legislation, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, supra note 16, at 39 tbl.4-2.
70. See supra note 45.
71. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME &
JUST. 479, 479–80 (1999).
72. REIMERS, supra note 23, at 3.
73. MICHAEL TONRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 175721, THE FRAGMENTATION OF
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 1 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/175721.pdf.
74. Rachel E. Barkow and Kathleen M. O’Neill argue that a desire to restrain growth in the
costs of incarceration is an important factor in explaining the creation of sentencing commissions
and the adoption of guidelines. However, they find mixed evidence in support of this hypothesis.
Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of
Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 2006 tbl.2, 2009 & n.169
(2006).
75. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34, at 9 fig.2.
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Moreover, other states were motivated to enact determinate sentencing
reforms in order to increase uniformity in prison sentences. One of the
primary goals of sentencing guidelines was to increase sentence uniformity
by requiring or recommending that judges impose sentences within a
predetermined range.76 Similarly, discretionary parole release was often
perceived as producing disparate release dates for similar criminals.77 Both
the abolition of discretionary parole and the implementation of truth-insentencing legislation were expected to increase uniformity in time served
by offenders because release dates would be set by statute.
Our empirical analysis includes several control variables to measure the
influence of public interest factors on legislatures’ decisions to enact
determinate sentencing reforms.
B. A Political Economy Model
In addition to public interest concerns, legislators considering
determinate sentencing reforms may be motivated by their own selfinterest. Political economy theories assume that political actors are selfinterested and influenced by factors such as the pursuit of ideological
goals, the accumulation of institutional power, or re-election concerns.78
We develop a political economy model to explain why legislatures
enact laws that constrain the discretion of judges and parole boards. This
theory necessarily focuses on political variables to explain states’ adoption
of guidelines and truth-in-sentencing laws. For example, when the state
legislature and judiciary are dominated by different political parties, there
could be a political interest in adopting stricter guidelines to indirectly
exercise influence on the bench. Similarly, when parole boards’ political
ideologies conflict with legislatures’ goals, legislatures may have a
political interest in enacting constraints on parole.
Our model assumes that there are three primary actors in this process–
the judiciary, the legislature, and the parole board. All three sets of actors
potentially have distinct preferences over the sentences served by
offenders. Their preferences may differ significantly if the actors place
different priorities on factors such as public interest concerns, electoral and
fundraising goals, or maintenance of the status quo.
76. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 17, at 33–36.
77. See generally Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
542, 543 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (noting that “parole release decisions were essentially unguided
by rule or principle, went unexplained, and were not appealable”).
78. Of course, re-election concerns can align politicians’ objectives with the public interest.
The political economy approach thus involves the additional assumption that such alignment is
imperfect, allowing politicians some leeway to pursue ideological and power-related goals. For
recent evidence suggesting that legislators are not tightly constrained by voters’ preferences, see, for
instance, Ebonya L. Washington, Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator
Fathers’ Voting on Women’s Issues, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 311 (2008) (arguing in support of a
hypothesis that a congressperson’s propensity to vote liberal increases as a function of the number
of daughters).
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The sequence of actions in our political economy model of determinate
sentencing reforms is as follows. First, the legislature enacts legislation,
which may or may not include guidelines or rules affecting the granting of
parole. Then, the judiciary imposes sentences on convicted offenders.
Finally, the parole board decides how much of that sentence each of the
offenders serves before being granted parole. Each relevant actor seeks to
achieve an outcome—the incarceration length or sentence actually served
by offenders—that is as close as possible to its preferred sentence, subject
to the applicable constraints, such as the need to build majoritarian
coalitions or limits on discretion imposed by statute.79
Clearly, this model is a highly simplified representation that does not
fully capture the complexities of the legislative and criminal justice
processes. However, the fundamental test of a model lies not in its
complexity but rather in whether its simplifications yield important
insights and testable hypotheses about the phenomena being analyzed.
1. Outcomes with No Sentencing Guidelines or Constraints on
Parole
We begin with the simplest version of our model—sentencing in the
absence of guidelines or constraints on discretionary rule. In this simple
model, the parole board enjoys a last-mover advantage. However, the
parole board can achieve its preferences over incarceration lengths only if
the parole board prefers less severe sentences than the judiciary. For
example, suppose the judiciary prefers that a specific type of offender
serves ten years. If a parole board prefers that such offenders serve only
five years, then offenders will only serve five years; the parole board with
discretion over release dates can release the offenders after they serve five
years of their ten-year term.80 In contrast, if the parole board prefers
fifteen-year sentences for these offenders while the judiciary prefers tenyear sentences, the offenders will only serve ten years.

79. This means that, for example, the sentence imposed by a judge can differ from the
sentence she actually prefers, as she may have to compromise between her true preferences and the
constraints created by external accountability. It is important to note that we assume that
preferences apply to sentence lengths actually served by the offender, rather than to the nominal
sentence that is imposed by the court. It may be possible to argue that nominal sentences may have
an “expressive” effect in giving voice to society’s disapproval of crime. However, policy
preferences are more likely to pertain to actual sentences served, as these influence the level of
deterrence and incapacitation of offenders. Moreover, any expressive effect of nominal sentences is
likely to be undermined when the public perceives a divergence between nominal and actual
sentences.
80. This is, of course, subject to a number of caveats. For instance, parole boards will
consider factors such as the prisoner’s behavior in prison when determining whether the prisoner
should be released. However, in the example above, the parole board will seek to release offenders
after five years, on average.
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Thus, the parole board can effectively reduce incarceration lengths, but
they cannot increase incarceration lengths beyond the court-imposed
sentence. The parole board’s “last-mover advantage”—its ability to
determine unilaterally the actual sentence served—is only relevant when
the judiciary prefers more severe sentences. Hence, in the absence of
guidelines and laws constraining the parole board, our model predicts that
i) the judges’ preferences prevail when they prefer lenient sentences, ii) the
parole boards’ preferences prevail when it prefers lenient sentences, and
iii) severe sentences can only be achieved when both judges and parole
boards prefer more severe sentences. Figure 1 depicts this relationship
between judges’ and parole boards’ preferences and sentence lengths.
Figure 1
The Relationship Between Judges’ and Parole Boards’ Preferences and
Sentence Lengths

Moreover, our model also predicts that legislatures have no incentive to
constrain either parole boards or judges if the legislatures’ preferences
coincide with the preferences of the actor that controls incarceration
lengths. If the legislature has lenient preferences similar to those of either
judges or parole boards, then the legislature achieves its preferred
incarceration lengths. For example, if both judges and the legislature prefer
five-year sentences, but the parole board prefers ten-year sentences, then
both the court-imposed sentence and the incarceration length are five years.
Similarly, if both parole boards and the legislature prefer five-year
sentences, but judges prefer ten-year sentences, then the court-imposed
sentence is ten years, but incarceration lengths are only five years.
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2. Extension One: Constraints on Parole
Consider now an extension of the simple model to include constraints
on parole—either the abolition of discretionary parole or the enactment of
truth-in-sentencing laws. As an immediate consequence of constraints on
parole, the parole board can no longer undermine the sentencing
preferences of the judiciary. Thus, the enactment of constraints on parole
increases judges’ influence over sentencing because incarceration lengths
are closer to the court-imposed sentences.
Our model yields two predictions. First, constraints on parole will only
affect incarceration lengths when parole boards prefer more lenient
sentences than judges. As our simple model already revealed, parole
boards’ preferences only affect incarceration lengths when parole boards
prefer more lenient sentences than judges. In contrast, if parole boards had
more severe preferences than judges, constraints on parole would have no
effect on sentences.
Second, our model predicts that legislatures have an incentive to enact
constraints on parole only when parole boards’ preferences are more
lenient than those of the legislature. If the parole boards’ preferences are
more severe than the legislatures’ preferences, then constraints on parole
will not help legislatures achieve their desired incarceration lengths.
To illustrate the reasoning, consider the following three examples. First,
suppose that the parole board prefers sentences of five years, and both the
legislature and the judiciary prefer ten-year sentences. Constraints on
parole will cause incarceration lengths to increase from five to ten years.
Without constraints on parole, the court-imposed sentence is ten years, but
the parole board releases inmates after five years; with constraints on
parole, both the court-imposed sentence and the incarceration length are
ten years.
In contrast, assume that the legislature prefers five-year sentences while
the parole board and judiciary prefer ten-year sentences. Now the
legislature has no incentive to enact constraints on parole; with or without
constraints on parole, both the court-imposed sentence and the
incarceration period are ten years. Similarly, if both the legislature and the
parole board prefer five-year sentences, but the judiciary prefers ten-year
sentences, there is no reason to enact constraints on parole; the parole
board is already achieving the legislatures’ preferences by releasing
inmates early.81
81. However, it is important to recognize that legislatures may enact constraints on parole for
strategic reasons, even if the constraints will not affect incarceration lengths. For example,
legislatures may engage in “position-taking” by signaling to the electorate that they are “tough on
crime” while allowing the parole boards to enforce relatively lenient sentences that are closer to the
legislature’s true preferences. For a discussion of position-taking in legislatures, see, for example,
Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive
Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (contrasting
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Thus, our model predicts that legislatures have an incentive to enact
constraints on parole only when parole boards’ preferences are more
lenient than the legislature’s.
3. Extension Two: Sentencing Guidelines
Consider another extension of the model to include only sentencing
guidelines with no constraints on parole. Legislatures enact sentencing
guidelines to provide judges with either a mandatory or recommended
range of sentences. The minimum sentences in the guidelines’ range will
constrain only lenient judges who would prefer to impose a sentence below
the minimum; the minimum sentence is irrelevant for judges with severe
sentencing preferences. However, our model predicts that the minimum
sentence only affects incarceration lengths when parole boards have severe
preferences. If the parole board is more lenient than judges and the
legislature, it can undermine the court-imposed sentence with or without
guidelines.
To illustrate this reasoning, suppose that judges prefer five-year
sentences, the parole board prefers ten-year sentences, and the guidelines’
sentencing range is eight to ten years. Before the guidelines, both the courtimposed sentence and the incarceration length would be five years; after
the guideline, both the court-imposed sentence and the incarceration length
would be eight years. Thus, because the parole board is more severe than
judges, sentencing guidelines will affect incarceration periods.
In contrast, assume that parole boards have more lenient preferences
than judges. Assume that the parole board prefers five years, the judiciary
prefers seven years, and the guidelines’ sentencing range is eight to twelve
years. The guidelines do not affect incarceration lengths. Prior to the
guidelines, the court-imposed sentence was seven years and parole boards
released inmates after five years; after the guidelines, the judges impose
sentences of eight years, but parole boards still release inmates after five
years. Thus, because the lenient parole board can undermine the courtimposed sentence with or without guidelines, the guidelines do not affect
incarceration lengths.
Similarly, the maximum sentence in the guidelines’ range will constrain
only severe judges who would prefer to impose a longer sentence.
However, our model predicts that the guidelines’ maximum sentence only
affects incarceration lengths when the parole board has severe preferences.
If the parole board is more lenient than judges and the legislature, then they
can undermine the court-imposed sentence with or without sentencing
guidelines.
outcome-oriented preferences where legislatures are concerned with legislative outcomes as are
voters likely to reward or punish the legislature, as a whole, with position-taking preferences where
voters reward or punish individual legislators, distinguishing among those who voted favorably and
unfavorably to voter wishes).
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For example, assume that the judiciary favors ten years, the parole
board prefers fifteen years, and the guidelines’ sentencing range is eight to
twelve years. Prior to the guidelines, both the court-imposed sentence and
the incarceration length were ten years; after the guidelines, both the courtimposed sentence and the incarceration length will be twelve years. Thus,
because the parole board is more severe than judges, sentencing guidelines
will affect incarceration lengths.
In contrast, assume that that the parole board prefers five years, the
judiciary favors fifteen years, and the guidelines’ sentencing range is eight
to twelve years. Prior to the guidelines, judges imposed sentences of fifteen
years and parole boards released inmates after five years; after the
guidelines, judges impose sentences of twelve years and parole boards
release inmates after five years. Thus, because the parole board is more
lenient than the judges, the guidelines will not change the incarceration
lengths.
Thus, our model predicts that sentencing guidelines affect incarceration
lengths either when the judiciary is more lenient or more severe than the
legislature but only if the parole board has severe preferences over
sentencing. A lenient parole board can undermine sentences with or
without the guidelines. Thus, the legislature has the incentive to introduce
sentencing guidelines when the judiciary’s preferences are too extreme
relative to the legislature—either too lenient or too severe—but only when
the parole board also has severe preferences.
4. Extension Three: Sentencing Guidelines and Constraints on
Parole
Finally, we extend our model to consider the circumstances in which
legislatures might want to enact both sentencing guidelines and constraints
on parole. Recall that our model’s first extension predicted that legislatures
will enact constraints on parole when the parole board is too lenient. Our
model’s second extension predicted that legislatures will enact sentencing
guidelines when the judiciary’s preferences are either too lenient or too
severe but only when the parole board has severe preferences.
Our model’s final extension completes this picture; legislatures will
enact both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole when the
judiciary’s preferences are either too lenient or too severe but only when
the parole board has lenient preferences. When parole is constrained, the
guidelines directly affect the judiciary’s discretion over incarceration
lengths because the parole board can no longer undermine the courtimposed sentence. Our model reveals that when judges are very lenient, the
guidelines’ minimum sentence binds and judicial influence is reduced.
When judges are quite severe, the guidelines’ maximum sentence binds;
judicial influence is also reduced. However, if judges had the same
preferences as the legislature, there would be no reason to limit their
discretion with sentencing guidelines.
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To illustrate the reasoning, consider the following two examples. First,
consider the case when both the parole board and judiciary are more lenient
than the legislature. Assume that both the judiciary and the parole board
prefer sentences of five years, but the legislature prefers sentences of ten
years. If there are no constraints on discretion, both the court-imposed
sentence and the incarceration length are five years. If only constraints on
parole are enacted, the court-imposed sentence and incarceration length
remain five years. If only sentencing guidelines of, say, ten to twelve years
are enacted, the court imposes a sentence of ten years, but the parole board
still releases inmates in five years. Only both sentencing guidelines and
constraints on parole will achieve the legislature’s preferences. If both
constraints are enacted, judges impose ten-year sentences, and the courtimposed sentence cannot be undermined by parole boards.
Next, consider the case of a lenient parole board and a judiciary that is
more severe than the legislature. Assume that the judiciary prefers fifteenyear sentences, the parole board prefers five-year sentences, but the
legislature prefers ten-year sentences. If there are no constraints on
discretion, the court-imposed sentence is fifteen years and the incarceration
length is five years. If only constraints on parole are enacted, both the
court-imposed sentence and the incarceration length are fifteen years. If
only sentencing guidelines of, say, ten to twelve years are enacted, the
court imposes a sentence of ten years, but the parole board still releases
inmates in five years. Both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole
are necessary to achieve the legislature’s preferences. If both constraints
are enacted, judges impose ten-year sentences, and the court-imposed
sentence cannot be undermined by parole boards.
Thus, our model predicts that legislatures have the incentive to enact
both constraints on parole and sentencing guidelines when parole boards
are lenient and undermine court-imposed sentences and when judges have
preferences that are too extreme relative to the legislature.
5. Summarizing the Model
We can summarize the predictions of our model as follows:
1. Legislatures have no incentive to constrain either parole
boards or judges if the legislatures’ preferences equal the
preferences of the actor that controls incarceration
lengths.
2. Legislatures have an incentive to enact constraints on
parole when parole boards’ preferences are more lenient
than the legislatures’ preferences.
3. Legislatures have an incentive to enact only sentencing
guidelines when either the judiciary is more lenient or
more severe than the legislature, but the guidelines only
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affect incarceration lengths if the parole board has severe
preferences over sentencing.
4. Legislatures have an incentive to enact both sentencing
guidelines and constraints on parole when the parole board
is lenient and judges’ preferences conflict with the
legislatures preferences, regardless of whether they are too
lenient or too severe.
These predictions from our political economy model depend on the
preferences of the various actors over sentencing, but these preferences are
not directly observable in reality. However, we can translate these
theoretical predictions into testable hypotheses by making a
straightforward general assumption. Namely, we assume that the political
affiliations of the actors are good proxies for their sentencing preferences.
That is, we assume that actors affiliated with the Republican Party tend to
have more severe preferences over sentences, whereas actors affiliated with
the Democratic Party tend to have more lenient preferences. Admittedly,
this assumption will not be accurate for all judges. However, as long as this
assumption is an accurate generalization—on average, Republicans have
more severe preferences than Democrats—it suffices for forming testable
predictions.82
Using this assumption, our model produces the following testable
hypothesis:
1. When legislatures, judges, and parole boards are affiliated
with the same political party and have similar sentencing
goals, then the legislature has little incentive to enact
either sentencing guidelines or constraints on parole.
2. The legislature has an incentive to enact constraints on
parole when the parole board is too lenient, or in other
words, when the parole board is affiliated with the
Democratic Party and the legislature is affiliated with the
Republican Party.
3. The legislature has an incentive to enact sentencing
guidelines when judges’ sentencing goals conflict with the
legislature’s goals, or in other words, when judges are
from a different political party than the legislature—either
Republican or Democrat.

82. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that this assumption is an accurate generalization.
See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623 (2009)
(arguing that judges who must be reelected by Republican voters tended to rule in accordance with
Republican policy, such as against defendants in criminal appeals, whereas judges facing re-election
from Democratic voters were judiciously more liberal).
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In the next Part, our empirical analysis estimates the influences of
several public interest concerns and political economy concerns on
legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms. For
example, our empirical estimation includes proxies for incarceration costs
and rising crime rates to measure the influence of these public interest
concerns. Likewise, we include several variables that represent the
predictions of our political economy model. For example, we include
measures of divided government to determine whether divergent
preferences between the legislature, judiciary, and parole board influence
legislatures’ enactment of determinate sentencing reforms. We also
consider whether legislatures are more likely to enact sentencing guidelines
to constrain elected judges, who may have preferences that are more likely
to diverge from the legislature’s than those of appointed judges.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: INFLUENCES ON THE ENACTMENT OF
DETERMINATE SENTENCING REFORMS
We perform several analyses that measure the influence of both public
interest concerns and political economy concerns on the enactment of
sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing legislation, and abolishment of
discretionary parole. We first describe the public interest and political
economy variables used in our analyses. Then, we present the basic data to
see if general trends emerge among states that have and have not enacted
determinate sentencing reforms. Next, we perform more sophisticated
analyses in order to isolate the influence of political economy variables and
public interest variables on legislatures’ decisions to enact reforms. We
discuss both the empirical methodology and the results from these more
sophisticated techniques.
A. Political Economy and Public Interest Variables
Our analyses include several variables that represent either the political
economy concerns or public interest concerns of state legislatures. The
political economy variables directly test the predictions of our political
economy model; they measure the degree of political divisiveness and
tension among the sentencing goals of legislatures, judges, and parole
boards. Likewise, we employ specific public interest variables to test
whether the purported social goals of determinate sentencing—reducing
crime and controlling correctional budgets—are consistent with the actual
data.
1. Political Economy Concerns
Our political economy variables fall into two general categories:
divided government variables and variables that reflect the need for
legislative oversight of judges and parole boards.
First, we include variables that represent the political divergence among
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state legislatures, judges, and parole boards. When a state’s legislature,
parole board, and judges have different political affiliations, a conflict
among sentencing goals is more likely. In our analysis, the majority party
of the legislature represents the political preferences of the legislature.
Unfortunately, the political preferences of the parole board and state judges
are typically unknown. However, we proxy these preferences with the
political party of the governor in each state. Because governors appoint the
parole board in each state, the political preferences of the governor will
typically be consistent with the preferences of parole board members.83
Moreover, in 24.3% of jurisdictions, trial court judges initially are
appointed either directly by the governor or by a judicial nominating
commission with many members appointed by the governor and with the
governor making either the nominating decisions or final appointment
decisions.84 In addition, 43.2% of trial court judges are initially elected
through partisan elections where receiving a party’s nomination can be
critical to a candidate’s victory.85 Thus, political party leaders effectively
chose many of the states’ trial court judges.
Thus, when a state’s governor and legislature have different political
affiliations, there is more likely to be conflict among the sentencing goals
of legislatures, parole boards, and judges. Moreover, we measure the
history of political divisiveness between the governor and state legislature
instead of the current political divisiveness. Because many judges have
long, fixed terms and low turnover rates due to automatic reappointments
or uncontested re-elections,86 the history of political divisiveness is more
relevant than the current state of political divisiveness. Thus, a long history
of divided government may produce clashes among the sentencing goals of
legislatures and the governor-appointed parole boards and judges.
Legislatures may try to reduce the tension by enacting determinate
sentencing reforms that constrain the parole boards and judges.
We include two different measures of the history of political
divisiveness between the executive and legislative branches of each state:
83. In most states, parole boards are executive branch agencies. See JOAN PETERSILIA, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHEN PRISONERS RETURN TO THE COMMUNITY: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 6 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184253.pdf (“In
most States, the chair and all members of the parole board are appointed by the Governor.”); Eric C.
Tung, Comment, Does the Prior Conviction Exception Apply to a Criminal Defendant’s Supervised
Release Status?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1323, 1323 n.1 (2009) (noting that state governors typically
appoint state parole boards).
84. AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT NO. 2 OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS 299 (1998).
85. Id. See also Steven Zeidman, Judicial Politics: Making the Case for Merit Selection, 68
ALB. L. REV. 713, 718 (2005) (explaining how a party’s nomination in New York judicial elections
is “tantamount to victory”).
86. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the
Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 369 (1980).
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the number of years since 1960 with Republican governors when the
current legislature has a Democratic majority and the number of years since
1960 with Democratic governors when the current legislature has a
Republican majority. We separate the political divisiveness variable by
party affiliation because we expect that the majority party of the legislature
may be relevant to the decision to enact determinate sentencing reforms.
Although there is generally bipartisan support for sentencing guidelines,
truth-in-sentencing laws, and abolition of discretionary parole, most of the
reforms have been motivated by concerns over rising crime rates. Because
the crime-fighting purpose of the guidelines more closely aligns with the
Republican platform, we expect that Republican legislatures are more
likely to enact these reforms. Moreover, our political economy model
predicts that Republican legislatures will have a stronger incentive to
constrain Democratic parole boards with lenient sentencing preferences.
We include other variables that measure the need for legislative control
or oversight over judges’ and parole boards’ decisions. Various
institutional factors may affect the amount of discretion judges and parole
boards have, and the amount of oversight needed if legislatures’ sentencing
goals conflict with these other actors’ goals.
First, we include a variable that represents whether judges face partisan
or nonpartisan re-elections. Judges that face re-election by the voters will
likely have more extreme preferences than judges that face reappointment
by another government official. Judges that face future gubernatorial or
legislative reappointment tend to vote more moderately than elected judges
for two reasons. First, because appointed judges can never be certain of the
politics of the government branch that will be responsible for their future
retention, they have the incentive to vote moderately in order to appeal to
politicians from either political party.87 Second, governors and legislatures
also tend to appoint moderate judges in order to increase the likelihood that
future governors and legislatures of either party will reappoint the judges
they originally selected.88
In contrast, elected judges have very different incentives. As ideological
changes in voters do not occur as suddenly as the executive or legislative
branches can change power, elected judges do not face the same incentives
to vote moderately in order to appeal to future politicians from either
party.89 In contrast, elected judges need to appeal to a small subset of
citizens; voter turnout for judicial elections has historically been extremely
low with often less than 20% of eligible voters turning out to vote in

87. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Politics of Judicial Opposition, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 88, 92 (2010).
88. Id. at 92 n.3 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975)).
89. Shepherd, supra note 87.
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judicial elections.90 Moreover, the voters who actually do turn out may
have relatively extreme preferences; their extreme preferences may be their
motivation for voting.
We also include an indicator variable to represent whether criminal
sentencing decisions are made by judges or juries. In a majority of states,
judges impose criminal sentences after both jury and bench trials.
However, in six states—Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Virginia—juries select sentences after non-capital jury trials.91 The
actors making the sentencing decisions may be relevant to legislatures’
decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms. Conflicting sentencing
goals between judges and legislatures may be less relevant in states that
allow juries to impose many criminal sentences. Alternatively, legislatures
may feel that sentencing guidelines are more critical to constrain
inexperienced juries than judges; evidence suggests that jury sentences are
more varied than sentences imposed by judges.92
Although judges’ retention methods and jury sentencing may be more
relevant in the decision to constrain judges through sentencing guidelines,
they could also be relevant in the decision to constrain parole boards.
Parole boards are the last movers in the sentencing process because their
decisions are reactions to the court-imposed sentence. Thus, the
preferences of the judges or juries making sentencing decisions should
affect the parole boards’ reactions to those sentences.
2. Public Interest Concerns
Next, we include several variables that represent legislatures’ public
interest concerns that may influence their decisions to enact determinate
sentencing reforms. First, we include variables that reflect legislatures’
concerns over high or rising crime rates. Determinate sentencing reforms
were enacted, in part, to eliminate the lenient and uncertain sentences that
resulted from indeterminate sentencing.93 Indeed, one of the purported
goals of sentencing guidelines, truth-in-sentencing legislation, and
abolition of discretionary parole was to increase imprisonment for criminal
offenders.
Thus, we include two variables that reflect legislatures’ concerns for
fighting crime. We include each state’s annual violent crime rates to
90. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52–53
(2003).
91. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004).
92. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases:
Comparing Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Two States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 331, 331–32 (2005) (analyzing two of the six states—Arkansas and Virginia—with jury
sentencing systems in non-capital cases).
93. Tonry, supra note 15, at 1247.
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capture the influence of crime rates on legislatures’ decisions, and we
include each state’s annual police per 100,000-person population (per
capita) to capture the states’ existing crime-control priorities.94
Legislatures may also be motivated by concerns of rising correctional
budgets. Indeed, some legislatures that enacted sentencing guidelines were
influenced by the desire to control the fiscal burdens of imprisonment.95
Thus, we include prisoners per 100,000-person population (per capita) to
determine whether prison capacity and correctional costs were important
factors in states’ decisions to enact guidelines.
We also include measures of the general political preferences of each
state’s citizens. The people elect legislatures to represent the will of the
people. Thus, legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate sentencing
reforms may reflect the wishes of the constituents more than the desires of
the legislators themselves. We include the Berry et al. measure of citizen
ideology to capture the general preferences of each state’s citizens.96 We
also include the Berry et al. measure of government ideology that measures
the ideology of the elected public officials in a state, which should
correspond to the ideological preferences of the voting citizens that elect
these officials.97 Both of these variables are well-known and frequently
used measures of ideology. They are computed from data on the interest
group ratings of the members of Congress, election returns for
congressional races, the party composition of state legislatures, and the
party affiliation of state governors.
B. The Basic Data
Our data set consists of 2,050 observations, one for each state for the
period 1960 to 2000. Thus, each observation represents a state in a given
year. The appendix presents an overview of the data, including each
variable’s sample mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum
94. We lag all variables by one year because contemporaneous variables and sentencing
reforms may exhibit reverse causality, where statutory changes may influence the variables.
Evidence on the potential reverse causality between violent crime and truth-in-sentencing laws can
be found in Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The
Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509 (2002) (noting, for instance, how
truth-in-sentencing laws may result in violent crime offenders switching from violent crimes to
property crimes that are not covered by the laws). Evidence on the potential reverse causality
between violent crime and sentencing guidelines can be found in Shepherd, supra note 14, at 535
(noting how sentencing guidelines resulted in increases in crime).
95. The original stated purposes of the guidelines in Delaware, Minnesota, North Carolina,
and Washington was to control resources. NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 10, 17, 19, 26 (2008).
96. William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American
States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998) (espousing on the authors’ development of
dynamic measures of the ideology of a state’s citizens and politicians).
97. Id.
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values. It also includes a detailed description of the sources of the data.
Figures 2 through 7 present the general trends in the data. The figures
compare the average value of each variable among the states with
sentencing guidelines, the states with either truth-in-sentencing laws
(abbreviated “TIS” in the figures) or abolition of discretionary parole, the
states with both reforms, and the states with neither reform. Figure 2
presents the data for the political divisiveness variables. It demonstrates
that states with neither sentencing guidelines nor constraints on parole have
a significantly lower incidence of divided government. This trend is
consistent with the predictions of our model—states with less political
divisiveness will have less tension among the sentencing goals of
legislatures, judges, and parole boards, and in turn, legislatures will be less
likely to enact reforms that constrain the sentencing discretion of these
other actors. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that states with Democratic
legislatures and divided government are more likely to enact sentencing
guidelines than constraints on parole, whereas states with Republican
legislatures and divided government are more likely to enact constraints on
parole than sentencing guidelines.
Figure 2
General Trends in Divided Government Measures
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Figure 3 presents the trends in the judicial institutional variables. These
institutional factors may affect the amount of discretion judges and parole
boards have and the amount of oversight needed if legislatures’ sentencing
goals conflict with these other actors’ goals. Figure 3 demonstrates that in
states where judges face re-election, sentencing guidelines are more likely
to be implemented than constraints on parole. A similar trend is visible in
states where juries impose criminal sentences. These results are consistent
with states enacting guidelines that restrict court-imposed sentences in
order to control the extreme preferences of elected judges and juries. In
contrast, constraints on parole are the least as likely in these states. This
suggests that states may prefer to maintain the parole boards’ discretion
with incarceration lengths when judges and juries have more extreme
preferences.
Figure 3
General Trends in Judicial Institutional Variables
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Figure 4 reveals the general trends in violent crime rates. The figure
reveals that there is a large difference in violent crime rates among states
with and without determinate sentencing reforms. Thus, the basic data is
consistent with the purported crime-control goals of both sentencing
guidelines and constraints on parole; states are more likely to enact reforms
when crime rates are high.
Figure 4
General Trends in Crime
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Figure 5 reveals the general trends in prisoners per capita. The data
reveal that both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole are more
likely in states with high imprisonment rates. This is consistent with states
hoping to control correctional costs through determinate sentencing
reforms; the reforms are more likely in states with high imprisonment
rates, and, in turn, high correctional costs.
Figure 5
General Trends in Prisoners
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Figure 6 presents the basic data on police per capita. This figure shows
that determinate sentencing reforms are more likely in states with more
police. This trend is also consistent with the crime-control goals of
determinate sentencing reforms; states that are concerned with crime rates
tend to hire many police. Moreover, the basic data also suggest that
sentencing reforms and police hiring are not considered to be substitute
crime-control policies.
Figure 6
General Trends in Police
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Finally, Figure 7 presents the general trends in the Berry et al. measures
of citizen and government ideology. Higher values of these ideology
measures indicate more conservative preferences. Thus, Figure 7, showing
the average Berry et al. score of each category, demonstrates that states
with more conservative citizens and governments are more likely to enact
determinate sentencing reforms. These trends are consistent with
legislatures striving to represent the will of the people.
Figure 7
Raw Data on Ideological Variables

C. Econometric Analysis
Although the basic data reveal general trends among states that have
and have not enacted determinate sentencing reforms, we perform more
sophisticated analyses in order to isolate the influences of political
economy variables and public interest variables on legislatures’ decisions
to enact reforms. After discussing our econometric methodology, we
present the results from several different estimations.
1. Methodology
Our econometric analyses measure the relationship between the
enactment of determinate sentencing reforms and several variables that
represent either legislatures’ public interest concerns or political economy
concerns. Our general estimation model is:
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Prob(Reform=1|x) = φ (β0 + β1*Political Economy Concerns +
β2*Public Interest Concerns)
In each set of estimations, we specify Reform in three different ways. In
the first specification, the dependent variable, Reform, is the presence of
sentencing guidelines in a state. In the second specification, Reform is
either the abolition of parole or the presence of truth-in-sentencing laws in
a state. Finally, in the third specification, Reform is the presence of both
sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole boards.
We estimate both logit models and semiparametric duration models to
ensure that our empirical findings are robust to different estimation
techniques. Our first set of estimations analyzes states’ decisions to enact
and maintain determinate sentencing reforms. Thus, our three outcome
variables are 1) the decision to adopt and maintain sentencing guidelines;
2) the decision to adopt and maintain either truth-in-sentencing legislation
or abolition of discretionary parole; and 3) the decision to adopt and
maintain both sentencing guidelines and constraints on discretionary
parole. We model these decisions as a dichotomous choice; each decision
to enact and maintain a reform is a positive outcome and each failure to
enact or maintain a reform is a null outcome. By coding as positive
outcomes both the year of enactment and the years after enactment that
states continue to uphold reforms, this estimation recognizes that both
political economy and public interest concerns are important, not only in
enacting but also in maintaining these sentencing reforms over time. Given
the dichotomous nature of the outcomes, we estimate this model with a
maximum likelihood logit model.98
Next, we analyze a slightly different question—what influences states’
decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms. Thus, in the second set
of estimations, we ignore influences on the decision to continue to uphold
reforms in the years after enactment. Thus, our three outcome variables
are: 1) the decision to adopt sentencing guidelines; 2) the decision to adopt
either truth-in-sentencing legislation or abolition of discretionary parole;
and 3) the decision to adopt both sentencing guidelines and constraints on
discretionary parole. By coding only the year of enactment as a positive
outcome (and coding subsequent years as a null outcome), this estimation
controls for the fact that it may simply be inertia, and not political economy
or public interest factors, that keeps these reforms in place. As these
outcomes are still dichotomous, our second set of estimations also employs
a maximum likelihood logit model.
For our third set of estimations, we employ a semiparametric duration
model. Like our second set of logit estimations, duration models also test
for influences on the decision to enact reforms, rather than on the decision
98. For a general discussion of the logit model, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIS 846 (4th ed. 2000).
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to both enact and maintain reforms. However, whereas the second set of
logit estimations measures the factors that influence legislatures to enact
reforms in a given year, the duration models are concerned with the length
of time that elapses before a state enacts this type of legislation. Thus, the
duration model estimations will reveal what factors influence the timing of
enactment—whether states adopt reforms early, late, or never at all.
Moreover, we employ a semiparametric duration model—the Cox
proportional hazards regression model. 99 Semiparametric models are
superior to parametric models because they do not require assumptions
about the distribution of failure times that could produce inconsistent
estimation of covariate coefficients if the baseline hazard is
misspecified.100 Cox’s model exploits the fact that, with survival data,
events that occur at certain times may be ordered so that estimates can be
obtained by pooling over the risk groups based on ordered survival
times.101 A partial likelihood calculation estimates the model.
2. Empirical Results
The results support the hypothesis that both political economy and
public interest concerns influence legislatures’ decisions to enact
determinate sentencing reforms. Tables 4, 5, and 6 report the results from
our estimations. The tables indicate the relationship between each variable
and the legislatures’ enactment and, in some regressions, maintenance of
each reform. In each table, the top number in each cell is the regression
coefficient, which indicates the magnitude and direction of each variable’s
relationship with legislatures’ decisions. A negative coefficient indicates
that a variable reduces the likelihood that a legislature will enact a reform.
In contrast, a positive coefficient indicates that a variable increases the
likelihood of enactment or maintenance of the reforms.
In addition, each table reports the t-statistic for each coefficient. In each
cell, the t-statistic is the bottom number, in parentheses. Coefficients with
t-statistics equal to or greater than 1.645 are considered statistically
significant at the 10% level, meaning that there is 90% certainty that the
coefficient is different from zero. T-statistics equal to or greater than 1.96
indicate statistical significance at the more-certain 5% level, and t-statistics
equal to or greater than 2.576 indicate statistical significance at the most99. See D. R. Cox, Regression Models and Life-Tables, 34 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 187 (1972).
100. See Bruce D. Meyer, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, 58
ECONOMETRICA 757, 769 (1990). Although these models are nonparametric because they make no
assumptions about the distribution of time to failure, there remains a parametric component because
we are still parameterizing the effect of the covariates. See MARIO CLEVES ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION
TO SURVIVAL ANALYSIS USING STATA 5 (2004). Thus, they are referred to as semiparametric. Id.
101. Essentially, a separate analysis on the probability of failure is performed at each failure
time, and then these analyses are combined. CLEVES ET AL., supra note 100, at 3. Because each of
the separate analyses made no assumption about the distribution of failure times, the combined
analysis also makes no assumption. Id. at 4.
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certain 1% level. Empiricists typically require t-statistics of at least 1.645
to conclude that one variable affects another in the direction indicated by
the coefficient.102 In the table, “*”, “+”, and “ª” indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
a. Legislatures’ Decisions to Enact and Maintain Determinate
Sentencing Reforms
Table 4 reports the results from our logit estimations that analyze states’
decisions to both enact and maintain determinate sentencing reforms. The
results show that several political economy concerns and public interest
concerns are associated with all three outcome variables: the enactment
and maintenance of sentencing guidelines alone, the enactment and
maintenance of either truth-in-sentencing legislation or abolition of
discretionary parole alone, and the enactment and maintenance of both
sentencing guidelines and constraints on discretionary parole.103
Table 4
Logit Estimation Results: Influences on the Enactment and Maintenance
of Determinate Sentencing Reforms

Political Economy
Variables:
For Current
Democratic
Legislature: Years
since

Sentencing
Guidelines

Truth-inSentencing
Legislation
and/or Abolition
of Discretionary
Parole

Both Sentencing
Guidelines and
Truth-inSentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary
Parole

0.04*

0.03+

0.04*

102. For each regression, the table also reports the pseudo R-squared statistic. In contrast to tstatistics, which measure the reliability of each individual coefficient, R-squared statistics measure
the regression’s overall goodness-of-fit. GREENE, supra note 98, at 236–38. The statistics range
from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating better goodness-of-fit. While the R-squared statistic
indicates goodness-of-fit in an OLS regression, the pseudo R-squared statistic measures goodnessof-fit in a logistic regression. UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group.
FAQ: What are pseudo R-squareds?, available at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/gen
eral/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm (last visited June 20, 2010).
103. The table reports the results from logit regressions on the decision to enact and maintain
each reform. In each cell, the top number is the coefficient estimate and the bottom number is the tstatistic computed from robust standard errors. “*”, “+”, and “ª” represent significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Sentencing
Guidelines

Truth-inSentencing
Legislation
and/or Abolition
of Discretionary
Parole

Both Sentencing
Guidelines and
Truth-inSentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary
Parole

(3.09)

(2.37)

(3.57)

0.08*

0.05*

0.05*

(6.89)

(5.43)

(5.03)

1.10*

-.374+

-.222

(6.16)
0.21
(0.82)

(2.49)
-1.61*
(4.37)

(1.61)
-1.74*
(3.10)

Public Interest
Variables:
Violent Crime rate

0.002*

0.0009*

0.002*

Prisoners 100,000 pop.

(7.23)
3.38*

(2.98)
3.01*

(6.72)
3.19*

Police 100,000 pop.

(6.54)
-7.42

(5.36)
-8.84ª

(6.31)
-13.42+

(1.22)
0.034*
(5.15)

(1.73)
0.026*
(4.89)

(2.48)
0.025*
(4.99)

0.009ª
(1.92)

-0.006
(1.61)

-0.002
(0.07)

1982
.2012

1982
.1196

1982
.1605

1960 with Republican
Governor
For Current
Republican
Legislature: Years
since
1960 with Democratic
Governor
Judges face Reelection

Jury Sentencing

Berry Citizen Ideology

Berry Govt Ideology
Number of
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
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The results reveal that both measures of divided government have a
positive influence on legislatures’ decisions to enact determinate
sentencing reforms. These results are consistent with our model’s
hypothesis that long histories of split parties produce clashes among the
sentencing goals of legislatures, parole boards, and judges. Our results
suggest that legislatures may try to reduce the tension by enacting
determinate sentencing reforms that constrain the parole boards and judges.
The coefficients are larger in magnitude for the divided government
variable with a majority Republican legislature than for the divided
government variable with a majority Democratic legislature. This indicates
that, consistent with the crime-control goals of these reforms, Republicans
are more likely than Democrats to enact and maintain these reforms. This
result is also consistent with the predictions of our political economy
model: Republican legislatures have stronger incentives to restrain
Democratic parole boards with more lenient sentencing preferences.
Although the coefficients in the table give the effect of each variable on
the log odds of enactment and maintenance of each reform, we can
interpret the coefficients using predicted probabilities.104 For example, the
coefficients reveal that the baseline probability of enacting and maintaining
sentencing guidelines in any particular year is only 5%. However, when the
legislature is currently majority Democrat while previously there have been
at least twenty years with Republican governors, the probability of enacting
and maintaining sentencing guidelines increases to 12.6%. Likewise, when
the legislature is currently majority Republican but there have been at least
twenty years with Democratic governors, this probability increases to
23.2%. Similarly, the baseline probability of enacting and maintaining
either truth-in-sentencing laws or abolition of discretionary parole is 9%.
However, the probability increases to 17.5% when there is a Democratic
majority in the legislature but there have been at least twenty years with
Republican governors, and the probability increases to 24.5% when there is
a Republican majority in the legislature but there have been at least twenty
years with Democratic governors.
The results also indicate that legislatures are more likely to enact and
maintain sentencing guidelines when judges face re-election by the voters.
This result is consistent with our prediction that legislatures are more likely
to constrain judges’ decisions when the judges have more extreme
preferences than the legislatures.
However, legislatures are less likely to enact and maintain constraints
on parole when judges face re-election. These results suggest that
legislatures want to maintain the parole boards’ discretion over
incarceration lengths when judges have more extreme preferences.
104. For a discussion of how to transform logit coefficients into predicted probabilities, see
ACADEMIC TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, UCLA, STATA DATA ANALYSIS EXAMPLES: LOGIT REGRESSION,
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/logit.htm (last visited May 10, 2010).
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Similarly, legislatures are less likely to enact and maintain constraints on
parole when criminal sentencing decisions are made by juries. This result
suggests that legislatures want to maintain the parole boards’ discretion
over incarceration lengths when inexperienced juries impose criminal
sentences.
Thus, consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, several
political economy concerns appear to influence legislatures’ decisions to
enact and maintain determinate sentencing reforms. The legislatures are
more likely to enact reforms when there is tension between the sentencing
goals of legislatures, parole boards, and judges—either because there is a
history of divided government or because elected judges have more
extreme preferences. Moreover, legislatures tend to not enact constraints
on parole, preserving the parole boards’ discretion, when court-imposed
sentences tend to be more extreme—either because judges face re-election
or because criminal sentencing decisions are made by juries.
In addition, public interest concerns also influence legislatures’
decisions to enact and maintain determinate sentencing reforms. The table
indicates that legislatures are more likely to enact and maintain both
sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole when violent crime rates
are high. This suggests that legislatures’ concerns over high crime rates
motivated them to pass and maintain determinate sentencing reforms.
Both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole are also more
likely when there are large numbers of prisoners. This result is consistent
with legislatures’ tough-on-crime mentality; states with high crime rates
tend to have more prisoners, and thus, legislatures are motivated to enact
reforms aimed at fighting crime. However, this result also suggests that
legislatures are not influenced by concerns over rising correctional budgets.
They tend to enact reforms that will increase imprisonment when prison
capacity and, in turn, correctional costs are already high.
Moreover, the results suggest that legislatures are less likely to enact
and maintain both sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole when
their states have a high proportion of police per capita. These results
indicate that when states have already taken measures to control crime by
hiring more police, they are less likely to enact reforms that will increase
incarceration lengths, possibly because these reforms serve as substitute
mechanisms for achieving deterrence.
Finally, legislatures are more likely to enact and maintain both
sentencing guidelines and constraints on parole when the states’ citizens
are more conservative. This result suggests that legislatures are striving to
represent the wishes of their constituents by enacting tough-on-crime
reforms.
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b. Legislatures’ Decisions to Enact Determinate Sentencing
Reforms
Table 5 reports the results from our logit estimations that analyze states’
decisions to enact determinate sentencing reforms.105 Once again, the
results show that both political economy concerns and public interest
concerns influence legislatures’ decisions.106
Table 5
Logit Estimation Results:
Influences on the Enactment of Determinate Sentencing Reforms

Sentencing
Guidelines

Truth-inSentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary
Parole

Both Sentencing
Guidelines and
Truth-in-Sentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary Parole

For Current Democratic
Legislature: Years since
1960 with Republican
Governor

0.07+
(2.17)

0.10+
(2.10)

0.04*
(1.98)

For Current Republican
Legislature: Years since
1960 with Democratic
Governor

0.09+
(2.25)

0.13+
(2.51)

0.05*
(1.95)

Judges Face Re-election

0.85ª
(1.66)

-.13
(0.24)

0.48
(1.21)

Jury Sentencing

0.51
(0.78)

0.06
(0.32)

0.14
(0.26)

Political Economy
Variables:

Public Interest
Variables:

105. In 1994, the federal government passed the 1994 Crime Act, which awarded grants to
states that enacted truth-in-sentencing legislation. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20102, 20103, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). In order to separate the influence of the
federal legislation from the political economy and public interest variables, we limited our time
period to pre-1994 in the estimations when the outcome variable is the decision to adopt either
truth-in-sentencing legislation or abolition of discretionary parole.
106. The table reports the results from logit regressions on the decision to enact each reform.
In each cell, the top number is the coefficient estimate and the bottom number is the t-statistic
computed from robust standard errors. “*”, “+”, and “ª” represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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Sentencing
Guidelines

Truth-inSentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary
Parole

Both Sentencing
Guidelines and
Truth-in-Sentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary Parole

Violent Crime Rate

0.002*
(2.77)

0.0003*
(2.25)

0.002*
(4.10)

Prisoners 100,000 pop.

-0.007
(0.29)

4.02
(1.03)

0.022
(0.03)

Police 100,000 pop.

11.42
(0.52)

20.42
(1.08)

8.37
(0.6)

Berry Citizen Ideology

0.007
(0.34)

0.012
(0.42)

0.001
(0.09)

Berry Govt. Ideology

0.019
(1.16)

-0.025
(1.15)

-0.004
(0.30)

Number of Observations
Pseudo R-squared

1982
.0862

1395
.0964

1982
.0637

The table reports the results from logit estimations when only the year
of enactment is coded as a positive outcome (subsequent years are coded as
a null outcome). Thus, these estimations ignore the influences of political
economy and public interest variables on legislatures’ decisions to uphold
reforms after enactment.
Nevertheless, the table reveals that the divided government variables
continue to have a statistically significant relationship with legislatures’
decisions to enact sentencing guidelines alone, constraints on parole alone,
and both reforms together. This indicates that not only is divided
government important to maintaining determinate sentencing reforms, but
it is also important to the initial enactment decisions. Once again, these
results confirm the predictions of our model: Long histories of divided
government produce clashes among the sentencing goals of legislatures,
parole boards, and judges, and legislatures respond by attempting to restrict
the discretion of the other actors.
Moreover, the coefficients continue to be larger in magnitude for the
divided government variable with a majority Republican legislature than
for the divided government variable with a majority Democratic
legislature. This result suggests that Republican legislatures’ tough-oncrime agenda was an important influence on their decision to enact these
reforms. It is also consistent with the predictions of our political economy
model: Republican legislatures have a stronger incentive to constrain
Democratic parole boards with more lenient sentencing preferences.
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The only public interest variable that has a statistically significant
relationship with legislatures’ decisions is the violent crime rate. The table
reveals that the higher the violent crime rate, the more likely legislatures
are to enact sentencing guidelines alone, constraints on parole alone, and
both reforms together. Once again, this confirms that legislatures’ concerns
over high crime rates influenced their decisions to enact these determinate
sentencing reforms. The statistical insignificance of the other public
interest variables suggests that, although these other variables were
relevant to the decision to maintain determinate sentencing reforms, they
are less important to the initial decision to enact these reforms.
Table 6 reports the results from our Cox proportional hazards
regression model. Like the previous logit model, this duration model
analyzes states’ decisions to enact, not maintain, determinate sentencing
reforms.107 The table reveals that the only significant variables are the
divided government variables. Again, this confirms the hypothesis from
our political economy model: Legislatures are more likely to enact
determinate sentencing reforms when their sentencing goals differ from the
goals of the judges and parole boards.
Table 6
Duration Model Results:
Influences on the Enactment of Determinate Sentencing Reforms

Sentencing
Guidelines

Truth-inSentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary
Parole

Both Sentencing
Guidelines and Truthin-Sentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary Parole

0.06ª
(1.71)

0.07ª
(1.83)

0.03
(0.79)

0.08+
(2.02)

0.11*
(2.57)

0.08+
(2.01)

0.67

-.15

-0.28

Political Economy Variables:
For Current Democratic
Legislature: Years since
1960 with Republican
Governor
For Current Republican
Legislature: Years since
1960 with Democratic
Governor
Judges Face Re-election

107. In 1994, the federal government passed the 1994 Crime Act, which awarded grants to
states that enacted truth-in-sentencing legislation. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). In
order to separate the influence of the federal legislation from the political economy and public
interest variables, we limited our time period to pre-1994 in the estimations when the outcome
variable is the decision to adopt either truth-in-sentencing legislation or abolition of discretionary
parole.
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Sentencing
Guidelines
0.08
(0.14)

Truth-inSentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary
Parole
-3.8
(0.532)

Both Sentencing
Guidelines and Truthin-Sentencing
Legislation and/or
Abolition of
Discretionary Parole
-1.29
(1.37)

0.0002
(0.17)

-0.0001
(.07)

-0.00009
(0.07)

4.36

1.38

4.79

Police per 100,000 pop.

(1.50)
-5.24
(0.18)

(0.29)
11.44
(0.68)

(1.10)
-9.18
(0.56)

Berry Citizen Ideology

0.014

0.037

0.013

Berry Govt. Ideology

(0.56)
0.013
(0.70)

(0.99)
-0.051
(1.55)

(0.45)
-0.007
(0.34)

Number of Observations
Chi-Squared Test

1755
.2179

1444
.0547

1427
.3150

Jury Sentencing
Public Interest Variables:
Violent Crime Rate

Prisoners per 100,000 pop.

c. Discussion of Results
The results from our empirical analyses strongly support the predictions
of our political economy model. Regardless of the estimation technique,
our measures of divided government have a strong positive relationship
with legislatures’ enactment and maintenance of sentencing guidelines and
constraints on parole. Long histories of divided government likely produce
clashes among the sentencing goals of legislatures, parole boards, and
judges. Our results suggest that legislatures respond to this tension by
enacting determinate sentencing reforms that reallocate power away from
judges and parole boards and towards the legislatures themselves.
The results also consistently show that Republican legislatures with
divided governments are more likely to enact determinate sentencing
reforms than Democratic legislatures with divided governments. This
result suggests that Republican legislatures’ tough-on-crime agenda was an
important influence on the legislatures’ decisions to enact these reforms. It
is also consistent with the predictions of our political economy model:
Republican legislatures have a stronger incentive to constrain Democratic
parole boards with more lenient sentencing preferences.
The results are weaker for most of the other variables. Violent crime
rates have a statistically significant relationship with determinate
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sentencing reforms in the two logit estimations, but the results from the
duration model are insignificant. The results for the other public interest
variables, elected judges, and jury sentencing are only statistically
significant in the initial logit estimations.
The weak results for most of the public interest variables suggest that
legislatures’ public interest concerns are not the primary determinants of
determinate sentencing reforms, as is often claimed. Instead, legislatures
appear to be primarily motivated by political economy concerns; namely,
they tend to reallocate power away from judges and parole boards when
those groups have political ideologies that conflict with the legislatures’
preferences.
V. CONCLUSION
The most significant development in criminal sentencing in recent
decades has been the shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing. In
this Article, we present the first study to explore the factors leading to this
shift. We develop a political economy model that explains why legislatures
acting in their own self-interest may be motivated to enact these laws. Our
model predicts that determinate sentencing reforms are more likely to be
enacted when there is tension among the political ideologies of
legislatures, judges, and parole boards.
Our empirical analyses confirm that political variables, such as divided
government, are a significant influence on legislatures’ decisions to enact
determinate sentencing reforms. These results are consistent with our
model’s hypothesis: Long histories of divided government produce clashes
among the sentencing goals of legislatures, parole boards, and judges, and
legislatures respond by enacting reforms that take power away from the
judges and parole boards.
Explaining the factors that influence legislatures to enact determinate
sentencing reforms is especially important given recent developments in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in relation to determinate sentencing.
Decisions in several recent cases threaten the future of sentencing
guidelines. In addition, constraints on parole boards have recently come
under attack as states target prison overcrowding and rising correctional
expenditures.
As states consider reforming their current guidelines or parole systems,
it becomes more important for scholars, criminal law practitioners, and
policymakers to understand the legislatures’ original motivations for
enacting these reforms. Contrary to the claims of many legislatures, the
reforms were not solely motivated by public interest concerns. Instead,
legislatures appear to be primarily motivated by political economy
concerns; namely, they tend to reallocate power away from judges and
parole boards when those groups have political ideologies that conflict
with the legislatures’ preferences.
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In light of these recent and ongoing developments in criminal justice,
these empirical findings have several important implications. Presumably,
states will be less hesitant to alter their current sentencing practices if they
understand that political concerns, rather than public interest concerns,
were the primary influence on the original enactment of determinate
sentencing reforms. This is especially true given recent studies that suggest
that not only does determinate sentencing increase correctional budgets,
but it may also increase crime.108
In addition, our findings suggest that future state reforms in response to
the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence in this area may depend on the
constellation of preferences among state actors. For instance, states in
which there is more agreement among the sentencing goals of legislatures,
judges, and parole boards may be able to enact more far-reaching reforms
that move away from determinate sentencing.
Overall, an understanding of the forces determining the original
enactment of these sentencing regimes can provide a valuable compass in
the uncertain times that appear to lie ahead for states’ criminal justice
systems.

108. Shepherd, supra note 14, at 533, 535. Shepherd, supra note 94, at 509.

1086

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

APPENDIX
A. OVERVIEW OF THE DATA
Our data contains observations from all fifty states from 1960 to 2000.
The data are arranged in a spreadsheet consisting of 2,050 rows and
numerous columns. Each row is an observation and reports data for each
state in a given year. Each column includes data on an individual variable
for that state-year. For example, row 1 in our sorted data would include
information on each variable for Alabama in 1960. Table 7 provides an
overview of each variable:
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum
Value

Sentencing Guidelines

0.1194

0.324

0

Maximum
Value
1

0.1578

0.3646

0

1

.2036

.4027

0

1

3.727

5.592

0

31

3.034

6.716

0

43

Judges Face Re-election

0.38

0.485

0

1

Jury Sentencing

0.12

0.325

0

1

Violent Crime Rate

370.38

243.11

9.5

1244.3

Prisoners per 100,000 population

177.48

136.94

20.3

901

Police per 100,000 population

22.5

12.4

6.9

211.5

Berry Citizen Ideology

46.62

16.39

.9625

95.83

Berry Government Ideology

48.34

23.93

0

99.39

Truth-in-Sentencing Legislation or
Discretionary Parole Abolished
Both Sentencing Guidelines &
Truth-in-Sentencing or
Discretionary Parole Abolished
Political Economy Variables:
For Current Democratic
Legislature:Years
since 1960 with Republican
Governor
For Current Republican
Legislature:Years
since 1960 with Democratic
Governor

Public Interest Variables:
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B. DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
Sentencing Guidelines
Data on the year of enactment of the state guidelines systems are from
three sources: Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity,
Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190,
1196 (2005); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 28 tbl.3-5 (1996),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf; and WILLIAM J.
SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE INFLUENCES OF
TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING
PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 11 tbl.1.5 (2002),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470_FINALTISrpt.pdf. There
were a few discrepancies between some of the sources, so we coded a state
as having truth-in-sentencing laws if either of the sources reported that the
state had enacted this legislation.
Truth-in-Sentencing Legislation
Data on the year of enactment of truth-in-sentencing laws are from four
sources: THOMAS J. HAMMER & MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, 2001 WISCONSIN
ACT 109: CRIMES AND THEIR PENALTIES 3
(2003),
http://www.wisspd.org/html/forprac/TISpartII.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL ET
AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING
REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON
POPULATIONS
5
(2002),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195163.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL
ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-INSENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES
AND
PRISON
POPULATIONS
11
tbl.1.5
(2002),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470_FINALTISrpt.pdf; and U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING: AVAILABILITY OF
FEDERAL GRANTS INFLUENCED LAWS IN SOME STATES 6 fig.1 (1998),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98042.pdf. There were a
few discrepancies between some of the sources, so we coded a state as
having truth-in-sentencing laws if either of the sources reported that the
state had enacted this legislation.
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Parole Abolition
Data on the year states abolished parole is from WILLIAM J. SABOL ET
AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR, THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-INSENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES
AND PRISON POPULATIONS 11 tbl.1.5 (2002), http://www.urban.org/Uploa
dedPDF/410470_FINALTISrpt.pdf.
Governors’ Party Affiliation
The data on political party affiliation of governors from 1960 to 2000 is
from Archive of Political Leaders by B. Schemmel, http://www.rulers.org/
index.html (last visited May 10, 2010).
State Legislature Party Composition
The data on party composition in each state legislature following each
two-year election cycle since 1960 was obtained via: E-mail from Tim
Storey, Senior Fellow, National Conference of State Legislatures, to
Joanna M. Shepherd, Associate Professor of Law, Emory University
School of Law (Mar. 20, 2006) (on file with author).
Judicial Selection
Data on the method of judicial selection is from AM. BAR ASS’N,
REPORT NO. 2 OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS 299 (1998).
Jury Sentencing
Data on jury sentencing in non-capital cases is from Nancy J. King &
Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State
Study, 57 VAND. LAW REV. 885, 886 (2004).
Crime Rates
State-level violent crime rates for the period from 1960 to 2000 are
available from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. These data can be
accessed on-line at the Database search of the Bureau of Justice Statistic,
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm
(last visited May 10, 2010).
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Police Employment
Data on full-time state police employees are from the Uniform Crime
Reports for the United States (1960–1992) and Crime in the United States
(1993–2000) both published by the U.S. Department of Justice.
Prison Population
Data on prison populations are from the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
National Prisoner Statistics data series, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?
ty=tp&tid=131 (last visited May 10, 2010). We are thankful to Lawrence
Katz for sharing prison population data from 1960 to 1990. E-mail from
Lawrence Katz, Professor of Economics, Harvard University, to Joanna M.
Shepherd, Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law
(May 11, 2005) (on file with author).
Berry et al. Measures of Government and Citizen Ideology:
Data on the Berry et al. measures of government and citizen ideology
are available at: http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/page0005.htm.
For a discussion of the measures, see William D. Berry et al., Measuring
Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93, 42
AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998).
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